How Long Should Copyright Last?

ATRIP Conference
2009-09-15

Rufus Pollock

[Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge]
~ Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License v3.0 ~

1. Introduction

(Aside) Attribution and Integrity

(Will Be and Should Be Left Out of This Analysis)

The 1841 Debate: Serjeant Talfourd

Serjeant Talfourd

The 1841 Debate: Macaulay

Thomas Babbington Macaulay

150+ Years Later: The Debate Hasn't Changed
(Though Term Has)

Jack Valenti

E.g. Jack Valenti, Forever Minus a Day and the CTEA

Philosophical Divisions
(Over Basis for Copyright)

Natural Right vs. Promotion of the Public Good

Do Not Want to Debate This Here

Though (My) Answer

Copyright is NOT a natural right but is created and maintained for the purpose of promoting and securing the public good

The Big M Word

Monopoly

The Trade-Off (or Back to Macaulay)

Thomas Babbington Macaulay

"It is good that authors be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil, but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for securing the good."

Our Task

(Should We Choose to Accept It)

To answer: how long should copyright last?

2. Utility and Price, Revenue and Welfare

(Or the Demand Curve Revisited)

An economist is a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

(With apologies to Oscar Wilde)

NOT TRUE

Price ≠ Value

Revenue ≠ Welfare

Best Seen With the Help of the Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

The Demand Curve

Demand Curve

Price, Revenue and Welfare

Demand Curve

Price, Revenue and Welfare

Demand Curve

Price, Revenue and Welfare

Demand Curve

Price, Revenue and Welfare

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

If costs already covered without (extra) IP: suffer the D/W Loss

The Effect of IP

Demand Curve

But if (extra) IP needed: gain consumer and producer surplus (and d/w loss irrelevant)

Southey and Wat Tyler

Robert Southey, the Poet

(Or: A Natural Experiment on Copyright and Access)

Sales Figures

DateEditionPrice (shillings)Production
1817 Normal price of a book of this length 10.15 500 or 1000
1817 Sherwood's editions 2 na
1817 Hone's Editions with explanatory notes 1 na
1817 Fairburn's Editions 1 na
1817 Bailey's edition 1 na
1817 Carlile's editiona na 20000 sold
1817 Sherwin's edition 0.25 na
Another Sherwin Edition 0.16 na
Total immediate saleb Believed to be ~60000
Southey's `Wat Tyler', all pirated. (Source: St Clair, Table 16.1 p. 318)

Unenforceability of copyright -> massive reduction in price (10-80x) and huge increases in sales (60x or more)

3. The Trade-Off

Trade-off Visualized

TODAY: Works available today from all past periods

NB: here no. of works produced is constant over time

Cultural Decay

Trade-off Visualized

But works from the past used less today (on average) -- fashion!

Copyright Expiry and the Public Domain

Trade-off Visualized

Gain deadweight 'loss' on PD works

Effect of Extension from T to T+1

Trade-off Visualized

More works (yellow), but suffer d/w loss on works from time T (black)

The Trade-Off

Trade-off Visualized

Here: gains (yellow) outweight losses (black): extension a good idea

As Term Increases: Trade-Off Worsens

Trade-off Visualized

Here: gains (yellow) less than losses (black): extension a bad idea

Why?

Copyright Revenue Suffers Double Whammy

Trade-off Visualized

1. Cultural Decay: c. decay for welfare (looking backwards) is c. decay for owners (looking forwards)

Copyright Revenue Suffers Double Whammy

Trade-off Visualized

2. Present Value: $1 today = $0.3 in 20y, $0.05 in 50y @ 6% ($0.18 and $0.01 @ 9%)

Diminishing Returns

Remember we care about welfare not number of works ...

Diminishing Returns

Diminishing Returns for Work to Welfare

1. Diminishing quality: 'Best' works are produced first (to some extent)

Diminishing Returns

Diminishing Returns for Work to Welfare

2. As we have more we need less: 'there are only so many films you can watch in a lifetime'

Deadweight Losses: Drop Much Less

No. of Works On Which D/W Losses Suffered is Going Up!

(Though of course there is cultural decay)

4. Bringing in the Data

What Do We Need to Calculate?

Trade-Off Visualized
  • Effect on work production: discount rate + cultural decay
  • Effect on welfare:
    • d/w loss to welfare on an avg work
    • Relationship of welfare for new work to total welfare
Sales by Sales Rank for UK Books
  • Effect on work production: discount rate (4-9%) + cultural decay (3-12%)
  • Effect on welfare:
    • d/w loss to welfare on an avg work (5-20%)
    • Relationship of welfare for new work to avg work welfare (12%)
  • Could make these media specific (but we won't)

Putting it Together

Probability Distribution Function for Optimal Term

Probability Function for Optimal Term: Point Estimate of 15 years with 99% confidence interval up to 38 years

5. Summing Up

Term is Far too Long!

All existing terms are longer than those found here

Why is Term So Long?

It's All About Power, Stupid!

A History of IP is Necessarily a History of the Power Relations Involved

'Rational' Analysis (Usually) Has Little To Do with It

Thank-You!

rp240 [at] cam.ac.uk / comments [at] rufuspollock.org

Full paper (equations and all) here:
http://rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/optimal_copyright_term.pdf